EU global peace diplomacy.  CEPS Commentary, 15 October 2012 by Blockmans, Steven.
 
Steven Blockmans is Senior Research Fellow at CEPS, where he heads the EU Foreign, Security and 
Neighbourhood Policy research unit. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. 
The  views  expressed  are  attributable  only  to  the  author  in  a  personal  capacity  and  not  to  any 
institution with which he is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2012 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
EU Global Peace Diplomacy 
Steven Blockmans 
15 October 2012 
he  Norwegian  Nobel  Committee  awarded  the  Nobel  Peace  Prize  for  2012  to  the 
European Union for its contribution over the last six decades “to the advancement of 
peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”. This is, indeed, a 
marvellous  honour  and  a  much-needed  boost  for  an  integration  project  that  is  currently 
suffering grave economic difficulties and considerable social unrest. 
The Nobel Committee has focused on what it sees as the EU’s most important achievement, 
namely the successful transformation of Europe “from a continent of war to a continent of 
peace”. To a large degree, the Union’s success story has been built on a strategy of wielding 
its ‘soft power’ to impose durable peace on aspirant members. The Cyprus issue stands out as 
a notable exception. Yet, EU enlargement continues to be an effective tool for peace-building, 
most vividly by way of the Union’s so-called ‘Stabilisation and Association process’ for the 
Western Balkans. 
Without implying any criticism of the Committee’s decision, it is a pity that the growing role 
of  the  European  Union  to  act  as  a  peacemaker  beyond  its  geographical  borders  was  not 
acknowledged in the award announcement.  
There is, of course, an explanation for this. So far, the EU has played only a minor role as a 
successful mediator between third parties and its record has been mixed. The highest-profile 
failure was perhaps when the EU, freshly endowed with a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and boasting with confidence that ‘the hour of Europe has dawned’, proved unable to 
stop the violent implosion of former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. At the end of that decade, 
the EU again  failed to prevent an eruption of armed conflict in the Balkans, this time  in 
Kosovo. 
Yet, in a few cases, the Union has been able to resolve status disputes in a peaceful manner. 
Among  the  noteworthy  cases  in  point,  one  might  mention  the  Russo-Georgian  ceasefire 
agreement brokered by the EU Presidency in 2008, implementation of the 2005 Aceh Peace 
Agreement, the 2002 Belgrade Agreement that introduced a 3-year cooling-off period before 
Serbia and Montenegro could hope to peacefully separate, and the 2001 Ohrid Framework 
Agreement that prevented violent clashes between the Macedonian government and Albanian 
militias from spiralling out of control. 
The EU is currently facilitating a dialogue to normalise relations between Serbia and Kosovo. 
By way of its High Representative and supported by the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), the Union is also leading international efforts in the Quartet to get the Middle East 
peace process going again, and in the so-called ‘E3+3’ to prevent nuclear proliferation in – 
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and possibly war with – Iran. These efforts, however, have yet to produce positive results. 
Farther  afield,  the  EU  has  been  instrumental  is  nudging  the  Sudanese  towards  a  peace 
agreement, and has assisted efforts to broker peace in Mindanao. 
The picture that emerges from the EU’s mediation efforts is roughly one of concentric circles 
emanating  from  the  Union’s  bureaucratic  centre:  as  the  ripple  effect  expands,  its  impact 
weakens. 
The  EU’s  soft  power  works  best  for  states  that  could  theoretically  meet  its  membership 
criteria. Thus, the EU is likely to get more traction when it throws its weight behind peace 
talks in its eastern neighbourhood (e.g. to settle the dispute over the breakaway republic of 
Transnistria),  than  when  it  does  so  in  order  to  resolve  disputes  in  or  between  its  non-
‘European’ brethren on the southern shores of the Mediterranean order (cf. Arab uprisings, 
and  Western  Sahara).  Arguably,  the  EU’s  power  of  attraction  wanes  once  outside  the 
European periphery and is really only defined in terms of development assistance and trade 
relations.  
Whereas the EU’s track record in peace diplomacy is rather modest, it is not the result of a 
lack of effort. EU actors, both at the highest political level but also at diplomatic level in-
country, have worked towards the peaceful settlement of disputes in various corners of the 
world. These efforts include the granting of financial and technical assistance, the imposition 
of restrictive measures on parties unwilling to cooperate in the search for a peaceful solution, 
the deployment of EU ‘blue helmet’ missions of various kinds to keep or build the peace, and 
much more. Yet, for all these initiatives, good offices, ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, none of these 
instruments has served as a strong leverage for securing sustainable dispute settlement beyond 
the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. 
With a history of colonial domination, the EU’s diplomatic slate is less clean than that of the 
Norwegians and the Swiss. However, some member states’ familiarity with previously held 
overseas territories may play to the Union’s advantage in bringing a political savoir faire to 
the negotiation table. The combination of the perception of absolute neutrality and a deep 
knowledge of local affairs may be the key to success for a future ‘European Institute of Peace’, 
an initiative jointly launched by Sweden and Finland and now spurred by the EEAS with the 
financial support of, inter alia, Norway and Switzerland. 
The EU is firmly intent on using its mediation (support) services whenever relevant and as 
part of  its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and resolution. This, of course, 
needs to be done in full coordination with member states and global actors like the United 
Nations, regional organisations such as the African Union, OSCE and the League of Arab 
States, national, local and civil society actors.  
As part of a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and resolution, the EU should 
strive to optimise the use of existing tools and instruments within the Union. The EEAS plays 
a particularly important role in the coordination of these instruments so as to develop coherent 
and effective external action.  
It  is  hoped  that,  in  spite  of  tight  budgets,  the  Nobel  Peace  Prize  will  motivate  the  new 
Laureate to redouble efforts to develop its mediation and dialogue capacities on the global 
scene. 